The paper revisits the problem of wage bargaining between a firm and multiple workers. We show that the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of the extensive-form game proposed by Stole and Zwiebel (1996a) does not imply a profile of wages and profits that coincides with the Shapley values as claimed in their classic paper. We propose an alternative extensive-form bargaining game, the Rolodex Game, that follows a simple and realistic protocol and that, under some mild restrictions, admits a unique Subgame Perfect Equilibrium generating a profile of wages and profits that are equal to the Shapley values. The vast applied literature that refers to the Stole and Zwiebel game to give a game-theoretic foundation to the use of the Shapley values as the outcome of the bargain between a firm and multiple workers should instead refer to the Rolodex game.
Introduction
We revisit the problem of wage bargaining between a …rm and multiple employees. The standard axiomatic solution for this type of multilateral bargaining problem is provided by Shapley (1953) , who derives a simple formula for the expected payo¤s to each agent starting from some desirable properties of any solution. The classic game-theoretic analysis of the bargaining problem between a …rm and multiple employees is provided by Zwiebel (1996a and 1996b) , who propose an extensive-form game with a simple and realistic protocol that admits, as its unique Subgame Perfect Equilibrium, a pro…le of wages and pro…ts that coincides with the Shapley values. The Stole and Zwiebel bargaining game (henceforth, the SZ game) has been applied widely in the labor-search literature 1 , where wages are not pinned down by competition because, due to search frictions, a …rm and its employees have to spend time or other resources in order to …nd alternative trading partners (see, e.g., Cahuc The paper contains two …ndings. First, we show that the SZ bargaining game does not support the Shapley values as a Subgame Perfect Equilibrium. Second, we propose an extensive-form bargaining game between a …rm and its employee that follows a simple and realistic protocol and that, under some mild restrictions, admits as its unique Subgame Perfect Equilibrium a pro…le of wages and pro…ts that coincides with the axiomatic solution by Shapley. We refer to this game as the "Rolodex Game,"after the rotating …le device used to store business contact information.
In the …rst part of the paper, we characterize the solution to the SZ bargaining game.
The game includes a …rm and n workers, who are placed in some arbitrary order from 1 to n.
The game proceeds as a …nite sequence of pairwise bargaining sessions between the …rm and one of the workers. A bargaining session follows the same protocol as in Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986), i.e. the …rm and the worker alternate in making proposals about the employee's wage and, after every rejection, there is some probability of a breakdown. The bargaining session may either end with an agreement over some wage, or with a breakdown.
In case of agreement, the …rm enters a bargaining session with the next worker in line. In case of breakdown, the employee exits the game and the whole bargaining process starts over with one less worker. When the …rm reaches an agreement with all the workers who are still in the game, the game ends, the agreed-upon wages are paid out and production takes place. As usual in the game-theoretic literature on bargaining, the focus is on the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of the game in the limit as the probability of breakdown goes to zero. Theorem 2 in Stole and Zwiebel (1996a) , in conjunction with Theorem 4, claims that the unique Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of the game is such that every worker earns the same wage and that this common wage is the worker's Shapley value. In particular, Theorem 2 claims that the unique Subgame Perfect Equilibrium wages are given by what they call the stable wage pro…le, and Theorem 4 establishes the equivalence between the stable wage pro…le and the worker's Shapley value. Stole and Zwiebel derive the stable wage pro…le in a heuristic way, by informally describing a bargaining environment and then conjecturing some properties of the solution. This heuristic approach allows them to derive the stable wage pro…le in an intuitive and simple way. The SZ game is meant to formalize the heuristic arguments and provide a rigorous game-theoretic foundation for the stable wage pro…le and, thus, for the Shapley values.
We prove that Theorem 2 is wrong, as workers who are in di¤erent places in the initial ordering earn di¤erent wages and, even on average, these wages are di¤erent from the worker's Shapley value. There is a simple intuition for this result. When the …rm enters a bargaining session with the last worker, it takes as given the wage agreements with all the previous workers. These wages do not a¤ect the payo¤ to the …rm if the negotiation with the last worker breaks down, as in this case the bargaining process starts over. However, these wages do a¤ect the payo¤ to the …rm if the …rm reaches an agreement with the last worker, as in this case the wages are actually paid out. For this reason, the wage agreements with the previous workers a¤ect the gains from trade between the …rm and the last worker and, in turn, the last worker's wage. For example, if the …rm agreed to pay the second-to-last worker one more dollar, its gains from trade with the last worker are one dollar lower and, hence, the …rm and the last worker settle for a wage that is 50 cents lower. When the …rm and the second-to-last worker bargain, they understand the e¤ect of their agreement on the wage of the last worker. In particular, they understand that the marginal cost to the …rm from paying the second-to-last worker an extra dollar is only 50 cents. For this reason, the second-to-last worker is able to extract a higher wage than the last worker. Similarly, when the …rm and the third-to-last worker bargain, they understand that if they agree to a higher wage, the wage of the last two workers will be lower. For this reason, the third-to-last worker is able to extract an even higher wage than the second-to-last worker. Since workers who bargain …rst can basically hold the …rm up and capture some of its gains from trade with the workers who bargain later, they obtain more than their expected marginal contribution to production (i.e., their Shapley value) and the …rm obtains less than its Shapley value.
Formally, we prove that (under a reasonable tie-breaking assumption), there exists a unique Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of the SZ game. In this equilibrium, the wage earned by a worker is strictly decreasing in the worker's position in the initial ordering. In particular, the gains from trade accruing to the …rst worker are one half of the total surplus, where total surplus is de…ned as the …rm's output net of the sum of the workers' outside options and the …rm's pro…t with one less worker. The gains from trade accruing to the second worker are one fourth of the total surplus. The gains from trade accruing to the third worker are one eight of the total surplus, etc. . . The gains from trade accruing to the …rm are a fraction 1 P n i=1 1=2 i = 1=2 n of the total surplus. In contrast, the Shapley values are such that the gains from trade accruing to each worker and to the …rm are equal to a fraction 1=(n + 1) of the total surplus. Therefore, the equilibrium wages di¤er from the Shapley values for a particular realization of the ordering of workers, as well as in expectation across any distribution of orderings.
The literature has proposed several extensive-form bargaining games that implement (in expectation) the Shapley values as a Subgame Perfect Equilibrium. Gul (1986) considers a game with n agents, each holding an asset that can be fruitfully used in production in conjunction with the others. Trade occurs through a sequence of bilateral random meetings.
When two agents meet, one of them is randomly selected to make a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er to the other. If the o¤er is accepted, the buyer remains in the market and the seller exits. If the o¤er is rejected, both agents remain in the market. The game ends when one agent acquires all the assets. While this game does implement the Shapley values, it does not conform to the structure of a typical labor market. Indeed, in the context of a labor market, the game implies that sometimes a worker sells his labor to another worker, and that at other times a …rm sells its capital to a worker. Hart and Mas-Colell (1996) consider a game with n agents. At each round, one of the agents is randomly chosen to propose an allocation. If all the other agents agree to the proposed allocation, the game ends and the allocation is implemented. If one or more of the other agents rejects the proposed allocation, the game continues. With some probability, the agent who proposed the allocation that was rejected leaves the game. With complementary probability, the agent remains in the game. In either case, another agent is randomly chosen to propose an allocation. While the Hart Mas-Colell game implements the Shapley values, it does not represent a realistic description of the bargaining process between a …rm and its employees. Indeed, according to this game, there would be instances in which a worker proposes a wage not only for himself, but also for all of his coworkers.
More recently, De Fontenay and Gans (2014) propose a non-cooperative pairwise bargaining game between agents in a network. The setting is very general, allowing for externalities and incomplete networks. Each agent bargains bilaterally with every other agent to whom he is connected via the network. He does not carry out these negotiations by himself, but rather delegates a di¤erent negotiator to each pairwise negotiation. These negotiations take place simultaneously and according to the protocol of Binmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky (1986) . Delegates are given instructions by their delegator prior to any negotiations. During negotiations a delegate does not receive any information about the actions taken in other pairwise negotiations, even those conducted on behalf of their own delegator. However, if any pairwise negotiation ends in a breakdown, this becomes public knowledge. For some speci…cation of the o¤-equilibrium beliefs, De Fontenay and Gans establish the existence of a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of this imperfect information game such that the payo¤ of each agent is related to the Myerson-Shapley value. In the absence of externalities and if the network is complete, it reduces to the Shapley value. The delegated-negotiator model appears appropriate for negotiations between …rms, although even in this setting the absence of any communication between delegates of the same …rm has been pointed to as a weakness (see, e.g., Crawford and Yurukoglu 2012). In the labor market context, however, the assumption that the …rm uses a di¤erent negotiator for each employee and that these negotiators do not communicate unless there is a breakdown is less appealing.
The above observations motivate the second part of the paper. There we introduce the Rolodex game, a novel extensive-form bargaining game between a …rm and its workers that follows a reasonable protocol with perfect information and that, under some mild restrictions, has a unique Subgame Perfect Equilibrium where the workers'wages and the …rm's pro…t coincide with the Shapley values.
The Rolodex game includes a …rm and n workers, who are initially placed in some order from 1 to n. The game proceeds as a …nite sequence of pairwise bargaining sessions between the …rm and one of the workers. Each bargaining session involves the same protocol. The worker makes a wage o¤er. If the …rm accepts the o¤er, it moves onto bargaining with the worker who, among those who have yet to reach an agreement, is next in the order. If the …rm rejects the o¤er, the negotiation breaks down with some probability. Otherwise, the negotiation continues with the …rm making a countero¤er. If the worker accepts the countero¤er, the …rm moves onto bargaining with the next worker. If the worker rejects the countero¤er, the negotiation breaks down with some probability. Otherwise, the worker 5 moves to the end of the line of workers who have yet to reach an agreement. The …rm enters a bargaining session with the worker who is now …rst among those without an agreement.
Whenever there is a breakdown, the worker exits the game and the whole bargaining process starts over with one less worker. When the …rm reaches an agreement with all the workers who are still in the game, the bargaining process comes to an end. We refer to this as the Rolodex game because the …rm cycles through the workers without agreement, rather than bargaining with each one of them until it either reaches an agreement or there is a breakdown.
We show that, under some mild restrictions, there is a unique Subgame Perfect Equilibrium to the Rolodex game. In this equilibrium, each worker earns the same wage and the common wage is equal to the worker's Shapley value. There is a simple intuition behind these results. Whenever a worker rejects the countero¤er of the …rm, he becomes the last worker in line. Hence, a worker at any position in the line follows the same acceptance strategy as the last worker in the line, even though the …rm's marginal cost from paying him a higher wage is lower than the …rm's marginal cost from paying the last worker a higher wage. For this reason, all workers earn the same wage as the last one. Moreover, the wage of the last worker is such that his gains from trade are one half of the total surplus net of the wage of the other workers. When these two properties are put together, it is immediate to show that each worker and the …rm capture a fraction 1=(n + 1) of the total surplus. These payo¤s are indeed the Shapley values.
The Stole and Zwiebel Game

Environment and Preliminaries
We begin by describing the extensive form of the bargaining game proposed by Stole and Zwiebel (1996a) . We shall refer to it as the SZ game. The players in the SZ game are a …rm and n 1 workers. If the …rm employs k 2 f0; 1; :::ng of the n workers and pays them wages w 1 , w 2 , . . . w k , its payo¤ is y k w 1 w 2 :::w k , where y k denotes the value of the output produced by the …rm with k employees. We assume that y k is strictly increasing and concave in k, i.e. y k < y k+1 and y k+1 y k > y k+2 y k+1 for k = 0; 1; 2; ::: Workers are ex-ante identical. If a worker is hired by the …rm at the wage w, his payo¤ is w. If the worker is not hired by the …rm, his payo¤ is b 0, where b might represent the value of employment at some other …rm or the value of unemployment.
The workers are placed in some arbitrary, but …xed order from 1 to n. The game consists 6 of a …nite sequence of bilateral bargaining sessions between the …rm and one of the workers.
The game starts with a bargaining session between the …rm and the …rst worker in the order.
The bargaining session may end either with an agreement over the worker's wage or with a breakdown. If the bargaining session ends with an agreement, the …rm enters a bargaining session with the next worker in the order. If the bargaining session ends with a breakdown, the worker permanently exits the game. In this case, the bargaining game starts over, in the sense that all the previous agreements between the …rm and the workers are erased and the …rm enters a bargaining session with the worker who, among those still in the game, is …rst in the order. The game ends when the …rm reaches an agreement with all the workers who are still in the game. When this happens, the …rm pays the agreed upon wage to each of these workers and production takes place.
Each bargaining session follows the same alternating-o¤er protocol as in Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986, henceforth BRW). The session begins with the worker making a wage o¤er to the …rm. If the …rm accepts the o¤er, the session ends and the …rm goes onto bargaining with the next worker in the order. If the …rm rejects the o¤er, the negotiation breaks down with probability p and continues with probability 1 p, with p 2 (0; 1). If the negotiation continues, the …rm makes a countero¤er to the worker. If the worker accepts the countero¤er, the bargaining session ends. Otherwise, the negotiation breaks down with probability p and continues with probability 1 p. If the negotiation does not break down, the bargaining session continues with the worker and the …rm alternating in making wage o¤ers until there is either an acceptance or a breakdown.
As in Stole and Zwiebel (1996a) , we shall focus on Subgame Perfect Equilibria (henceforth, SPE). In order to characterize the set of SPE of the SZ game, it is useful to recall the solution to the BRW game when an increase in the wage transfers utility from the …rm to the worker at a constant rate. When an increase in the wage transfers utility 1 for 1, we are in the canonical case of perfectly transferable utility. When an increase in the wage transfers utility at a rate di¤erent than 1 for 1, we say that utility is non-perfectly transferable. We are interested in this distinction because, as we shall see in the next subsection, the mistake in the proof of Theorem 2 of Stole and Zwiebel (1996a) is to apply the solution of the BRW game with perfectly transferable utility to an environment where utility is not transferred 1 for 1. 
Proof : The result follows immediately from Proposition 4.2 in Muthoo (1999) . the unique SPE is such that the …rm and the worker immediately agree to the wage in (1) .
Given this wage, the gains from trade accruing to the worker and the …rm are, respectively, given by
As the probability of breakdown p goes to zero, the solution to the BRW game coincides with the axiomatic Nash bargaining solution. In fact, the axiomatic Nash bargaining solution is given by the wage that maximizes the product of the worker's gains from trade and the …rm's gains from trade, i.e.
The solution to the maximization problem in (3) is
Given the above wage, the gains from trade accruing to the worker and the …rm are, respectively, given by
It is immediate to see that, in the limit for p going to zero, the outcome (1) and the payo¤s (2) of the BRW bargaining game coincides with the outcome (4) and the payo¤s (5) of axiomatic Nash bargaining.
The above results are all very well known. However, we wanted to repeat them here to point out the following fact. When utility is perfectly transferable, the limit of the solution to the BRW game for p ! 0 (as well as the axiomatic Nash bargaining solution) is such that the gains from trade accruing to the …rm are equal to the gains from trade accruing to the worker. When utility is not perfectly transferable, the solution to the BRW game (as well as the axiomatic Nash bargaining solution) is such that the ratio of the gains accruing to the worker to those accruing to the …rm is equal to 1=(1 ), which is di¤erent than 1 and strictly increasing in . Intuitively, the marginal bene…t to the worker from being paid an extra dollar is 1, and the marginal cost to the …rm from paying the worker an extra dollar is 
SZ Game with Two Workers
Let us begin the analysis by introducing some notation. We shall refer to n n (0) as the subgame in which the …rm is left with n workers, it has yet to reach an agreement with all of the workers, and it is about to enter a bargaining session with the …rst one in line. We denote with n the payo¤ to the …rm in this game, and with w n;i the payo¤ to the i-th of n workers. Clearly, the SZ game between the …rm and n workers is the subgame n n (0). We shall refer to n k (s) as the subgame in which there are n workers left in the game, n k of them have reached an agreement with the …rm for wages summing up to s, k workers have yet to reach an agreement with the …rm, and the …rm is about to start a bargaining session with the …rst of those k workers. We denote with w n k;i (s) the equilibrium wage of the i-th of the k workers without agreement, and we denote with t n k (s) the sum of wages of the k workers without agreement.
In order to gain some intuition, we study the SZ game with two workers. We solve the game backwards. First, we characterize the outcome of the subgame 1 1 (0) in which, after a breakdown with one of the workers, the …rm enters a bargaining session with the other one. If the bargaining session ends with the …rm and the worker agreeing to the wage w, the payo¤ to the …rm is y 1 w, and the payo¤ to the worker is w. If the bargaining session ends with breakdown, the payo¤ to the …rm is y 0 , and the payo¤ to the worker is b. In either case, when the bargaining session ends so does the subgame. The subgame is the same as the BRW game and we can characterize its outcome using Lemma 1. In particular, assuming that the gains from trade y 1 y 0 b are positive, the unique SPE of the subgame is such that the …rm and the worker immediately reach an agreement over the wage
In turn, this implies that the …rm's equilibrium payo¤ of the subgame is
When bargaining with the only worker left in the game, the marginal cost to the …rm from paying the worker an extra dollar and the marginal bene…t to the worker from being paid an extra dollar are both equal to 1. Hence, utility is perfectly transferrable and the ratio between the gains from trade accruing to the worker, w 1;1 b, relative to those accruing to the …rm, 1 y 0 , is equal to 1=(1 p), which as discussed in the comments to Lemma 1, converges to 1 in the limit for p ! 0.
Second, we characterize the outcome of the subgame 2 1 (w 1 ) in which, after reaching an agreement with the …rst worker over some wage w 1 , the …rm enters a bargaining session with the second worker. If the bargaining session terminates with the …rm and the second worker agreeing to the wage w 2 , the game comes to an end. In this case, the payo¤ to the …rm is y 2 w 1 w 2 and the payo¤ to the second worker is w 2 . If the bargaining session ends with breakdown, the second worker exits, all previous agreements are erased and the …rm enters a bargaining session with the one remaining worker. In this case, the payo¤ to the …rm is given by 1 in (7) and the payo¤ to the second worker is b. Overall, the bargaining session between the …rm and the second worker has the same protocol and payo¤ structure as the BWR game and, hence, we can characterize its equilibrium outcome using Lemma 1.
In particular, if w 1 > y 2 1 b, any SPE involves a breakdown between the …rm and the second worker. If w 1 y 2 1 b, the unique SPE is such that the …rm and the second worker immediately reach an agreement over the wage
When the …rm has yet to reach an agreement with only one worker, the marginal cost to the …rm from paying the worker an extra dollar and the marginal bene…t to the worker from being paid an extra dollar are both equal to 1. Hence, utility is perfectly transferrable and the ratio between the gains from trade accruing to the worker, w 2 1;1 (w 1 ) b, and those accruing to the …rm, y 2 w 1 w 2 1;1 (w 1 ) 1 , is equal to 1=(1 p), which again converges to 1 in the limit for p ! 0.
Notice that the outcome of the bargaining session between the …rm and the second worker in (8) depends on w 1 , i.e. the wage agreed upon by the …rm and the …rst worker. In fact, while w 1 does not a¤ect the …rm's payo¤ in case of disagreement with the second worker (as in this case, the …rm will renegotiate the wage of the …rst worker), it does negatively a¤ect the …rm's payo¤ in case of agreement with the second worker (as, in this case, the wage w 1 will be paid out). For this reason, the equilibrium wage of the second worker depends on w 1 . In particular, the wage w 2 1;1 (w 1 ) paid to the second workers-which is also equal to the sum of wages t 2 1 (w 1 ) paid by the …rm to the workers following the …rst one-is a function of w 1 of the form
where the coe¢ cient 1 is given by
Third, we characterize the outcome of the subgame 2 2 (0) in which the …rm has yet to reach an agreement with both workers. To this aim, consider the bargaining session between the …rm and the …rst worker. If the …rm and the …rst worker agree to a wage w 1 y 2 1 b, the …rm and the second worker immediately agree to the wage w 2 1;1 (w 1 ) and the game comes to an end. In this case, the payo¤ to the …rm is y 2 w 1 t 2 1 (w 1 ) and the payo¤ to the …rst worker is w 1 . If the …rm and the …rst worker agree to a wage w 1 > y 2 1 b, the …rm and the second worker do not reach an agreement. In this case, the …rm and the …rst worker renegotiate and achieve payo¤s of 1 and w 1 respectively. Finally, if the …rm and the …rst worker do not reach an agreement, the …rm is left with the second worker only. In this case, the …rm achieves a payo¤ of 1 and the …rst worker achieves a payo¤ of b.
The bargaining session between the …rm and the …rst worker does not have the same payo¤ structure as the BRW game, because the wage that the …rm and the …rst worker agree upon does not a¤ect their payo¤s if it leads to a breakdown between the …rm and the second worker. However, assume that, whenever indi¤erent, the …rm chooses to reject any wage demand from the …rst worker that would lead to a breakdown with the second worker and, similarly, the …rm chooses not to make any countero¤er that would lead to a breakdown with the second worker. Under this tie-breaking assumption, we show that the outcome of the bargaining session is the same outcome as in BRW (see Appendix A). In particular, as long as y 2 b t 2 1 (b) 1 0 or equivalently y 2 1 2b 0, the unique SPE is such that the …rm and the …rst worker immediately agree to the wage
In the bargaining session between the …rm and the …rst of two workers, utility is not perfectly transferable as 1 > 0. Indeed, the …rst worker's marginal bene…t from receiving a higher wage is 1, while the …rm's marginal cost is (1 p)=(2 p), as paying the …rst worker an extra dollar reduces the gains from trade between the …rm and the second worker by a dollar and, in turn, the second worker's wage by 1=(2 p) dollars. Therefore, the outcome of the bargaining session is such that the gains from trade accruing to the worker are not equal to those accruing to the …rm. Instead, the ratio between the gains from trade accruing to the worker, w 2;1 b, and those accruing to the …rm, y 2 w 2;1 t 2 1 (w 2;1 ) 1 , is given by (2 p)=(1 p) 2 , which converges to 2 in the limit for p ! 0. Now we can summarize the outcome of the SZ game between the …rm and two workers.
If y 2 1 2b 0, the unique SPE is such that the …rm reaches an immediate agreement with the …rst worker for the wage w 2;1 in (10). Since w 2;1 y 2 1 b, the …rm then reaches an immediate agreement with the second worker for a wage w 2;2 = w 2 1;1 (w 2;1 ). After substituting out t 2 1 (b) in (10), we …nd that the wage (and payo¤) of the …rst worker is
In turn, we can solve for the wage (and payo¤) of the second worker as
Finally, we can solve for the payo¤ of the …rm as 2 = y 2 w 2;1 w 2;2
In the limit for p ! 0, the payo¤s to the workers and the …rm are given by
Several remarks about the payo¤s in (14) are in order. First, the equilibrium wage of the …rst worker is higher than the equilibrium wage of the second worker. This is intuitive. If the …rm pays the …rst worker an extra dollar, the gains from trade between the …rm and the second worker will be 1 dollar lower and, hence, the wage of the second worker will be 50 cents lower. Overall, the marginal cost to the …rm from paying the worker an extra dollar is only 50 cents. In contrast, the marginal cost to the …rm from paying the second worker an extra dollar is 1 full dollar. Therefore, the utility between the …rm and the …rst worker is transferred at the rate of 1 to 2, while the utility between the …rm and the second worker is transferred at the rate of 1 to 1. For this reason, the …rst worker captures twice as much total surplus than the second worker, where total surplus is de…ned as y 2 1 2b.
Second, the payo¤s in (14) are di¤erent from the Shapley values, which are given by 3
The equilibrium payo¤s are not only di¤erent from the Shapley values in realization, as in equilibrium the two workers receive di¤erent payo¤s even though their Shapley values are identical. The equilibrium payo¤s are also di¤erent from the Shapley values after taking expectations over random orderings of workers, as for every realized ordering the equilibrium payo¤ to the …rm is 2 and di¤erent from its Shapley value 2 . Indeed, the …rst worker captures one half of the total surplus and the second worker captures one fourth of the total surplus and, hence, the …rm's payo¤ is equal to one fourth of the total surplus. In contrast, the Shapley value of the …rm is such that the …rm captures one third of the total surplus.
Finally, Theorem 2 in Stole and Zwiebel (1996a) states that the unique SPE of the bargaining game is such that the payo¤s to the …rm and to the workers are given by (15) .
However, the theorem is incorrect because we have established that the unique SPE of the SZ game features the payo¤s in (14) , which are di¤erent from the Shapley values in (15) . 4 The mistake in the proof of Theorem 2 in Stole and Zwiebel (1996a) is the failure to recognize that the wage negotiated by the …rm and a worker a¤ects the value to the …rm from reaching an agreement with the following workers and, in turn, it a¤ects the following workers'wages.
For this reason, the marginal cost to the …rm from paying a worker a higher wage is less than the marginal bene…t to the worker from being paid a higher wage. Hence, utility is not perfectly transferable and the solution to the BRW bargaining session (as well as the axiomatic Nash bargaining solution) does not equate the gains from trade accruing to the worker to those accruing to the …rm, which is what is incorrectly assumed in the proof of Theorem 2 in Stole and Zwiebel (1996a).
SZ Game with n Workers
The qualitative properties of the outcome of the SZ game with two workers generalize to the case of an arbitrary number of workers. The following proposition contains the characterization of the unique SPE of the subgame n n (0) in which the …rm has yet to reach an agreement with all of the n workers remaining in the game. nb 0, the unique SPE is such that the …rm immediately reaches an agreement with all of the n workers. The payo¤ to the …rm is given by
The payo¤ to the i-th worker is given by
For n = 1, Proposition 1 holds as the payo¤s in (16) and (17) boil down to the equilibrium payo¤s of the BRW game. For n = 2, Proposition 1 holds as the payo¤s in (16) and (17) are those derived in the previous subsection. In what follows we are going to prove that Proposition 1 holds for a generic n by induction. That is, we are going to prove that if the proposition holds for the subgame n n (0), it also holds for the subgame n+1 n+1 (0) where the …rm has yet to reach an agreement with all of the n + 1 workers left in the game.
Central to the characterization of the equilibrium of n+1 n+1 (0) is the following lemma. Lemma 2: Consider the subgame n+1 k (s) in which the …rm has n + 1 workers, it has yet to reach an agreement with k n + 1 workers, and it has agreed to wages summing up to s with the …rst n + 1 k workers. (i) If y n+1 s n kb < 0, any SPE is such that the …rm does not reach an agreement with all the k remaining workers; (ii) If y n+1 s n kb 0, the unique SPE is such that the …rm reaches an immediate agreement with each of the k remaining workers. The sum of the wages paid to the k remaining workers is
For k = 1, Lemma 2 holds as the payo¤s in (18) are the same as those in the BRW game.
We prove that Lemma 2 holds for any k n + 1 by induction. That is, we prove that,
if Lemma 2 holds for some arbitrary k n, then it also holds for k + 1. To this aim, we consider the subgame n+1 k+1 (s), in which the …rm has n + 1 employees, it has yet to reach an agreement with k +1 of them and it has agreed to wages summing up to s with the …rst n k workers. As usual, we characterize the solution to this subgame by backward induction.
First, consider the subgame n n (0) in which, after a breakdown in negotiations between the …rm and the …rst of the k + 1 workers without agreement, bargaining starts over between the …rm and the n workers left in the game. Since we have conjectured that Proposition 1 holds when the …rm has n workers, the SPE payo¤ of the …rm in this subgame is uniquely determined and given by n .
Second, consider the subgame n+1 k (s + w 1 ) in which, after the …rm has reached an agreement at some wage w 1 with the …rst worker without an agreement, the …rm starts bargaining with the other k workers without an agreement. Since we conjectured that Lemma 2 holds when the …rm has n + 1 workers and has yet to reach an agreement with k of them, there is a unique SPE to this subgame. In particular, if
the SPE is such that the …rm does not reach an agreement with all of the k remaining workers. In this case, the …rm's payo¤ is n . If w 1 w n+1 k+1 (s), the SPE is such that the …rm immediately reaches an agreement with all of the k remaining workers. In this case, the …rm's payo¤ is y n+1 s w 1 t n+1 k (s + w 1 ).
Third, we characterize the solution to the subgame n+1 k+1 (s). Consider the bargaining session between the …rm and the …rst of the k + 1 workers without an agreement. If the …rm and the worker do not reach an agreement, the worker exits the game and the …rm enters the subgame n n (0). In this case, the payo¤ to the …rm is n and the payo¤ to the worker is b. If the …rm and the worker agree to a wage w 1 > w n+1 k+1 (s), the …rm enters the subgame n+1 k (s + w 1 ) with negative gains from trade. In this case, the payo¤ to the …rm is n and the payo¤ to the worker is the wage earned by the (n k)-th worker in the game with n workers. Finally, if the …rm and the worker agree to a wage w 1 w n+1 k+1 (s), the …rm enters the subgame n+1 k (s + w 1 ) with positive gains from trade. In this case, the …rm reaches an agreement with all the other workers, the payo¤ to the …rm is y n+1 s w 1 t n+1 k (s + w 1 ) and the payo¤ to the worker is w 1 . Notice that t n+1
where the coe¢ cient k is given by
The bargaining session between the …rm and the …rst of the k + 1 workers without agreement does not have the same payo¤ structure as the BRW game because, if the …rm and the worker agree to a wage w 1 > w n+1 k+1 (s), their payo¤s do not depend on w 1 . However, assume that, whenever indi¤erent, the …rm chooses to reject any wage demand from the …rst worker that would lead to a breakdown with the second worker and, similarly, the …rm chooses not to make any countero¤er that would lead to a breakdown with the second worker. Under this tie-breaking assumption, we show that the outcome of the bargaining session is the same outcome as in BRW (see Appendix A). It then follows from Lemma 1
any SPE is such that the …rm and the worker do not reach an agreement. In contrast, if
SPE is such that …rm and the …rst worker immediately reach an agreement over the wage
In the bargaining session between the …rm and the …rst of k + 1 workers without agreement, utility is not perfectly transferable. Indeed, the …rst worker's marginal bene…t from receiving a higher wage is 1, while the …rm's marginal cost from paying him a higher wage is (1 p) k =(2 p) k , as paying the …rst worker an extra dollar reduces the sum of wages paid to the k following workers by k = 1 (1 p) k =(2 p) k dollars. Therefore, the outcome of the bargaining session does not equate the gains from trade accruing to the worker to those accruing to the …rm. Instead, as discusses in the comments to Lemma 1, the ratio between the worker's gains from trade and the …rm's is (2 p) k =(1 p) k+1 , which converges to 2 k in the limit for p ! 0.
We can now summarize the characterization of the subgame n+1 k+1 (s). If y n+1 s n (k + 1)b < 0, any SPE is such that the …rm and the …rst worker do not reach an agreement.
If y n+1 s n (k +1)b 0, any SPE is such that the …rm and the …rst worker immediately reach an agreement over the wage w n+1 k+1;1 (s) in (20) . Substituting t n+1 (20), we can write the wage w n+1 k+1;1 (s) as
Since w n+1 k+1;1 (s) w n+1 k+1 (s), the …rm then reaches an immediate agreement with the remaining k workers for wages totaling up to
The sum t n+1 k+1 (s) between the wage paid by the …rm to the …rst worker, w n+1 k+1;1 (s), and the wages paid to the remaining k workers, t n+1 k (s + w n+1 k+1;1 (s)), is equal to
These results establish that, if Lemma 2 holds for some k n, it also holds for k + 1. Since the lemma trivially holds for k = 1, this means that it holds for any generic k n + 1. We have thus completed the proof of Lemma 2.
Letting k = n + 1 and s = 0 in Lemma 2, we can characterize the payo¤s of the subgame n+1 n+1 (0). In particular, if y n+1 n (n + 1)b < 0, any SPE is such that the …rm does not reach an agreement with all of its n + 1 workers. In this case, the payo¤ to the …rm is given by n+1 = n . If y n+1 n (n + 1)b 0, the unique SPE is such that the …rm immediately reaches an agreement with all of its n + 1 workers. In this case, the payo¤ to the …rm is given by
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The above results show that, if Proposition 1 holds for some n, it also holds for n + 1. Since the proposition holds for n = 1, this means that it holds for any generic n = 2; 3... We have thus completed the proof of Proposition 1.
We are now in the position to characterize the solution of the SZ game in the limit as the probability of breakdown goes to zero.
Theorem 1: (Stole and Zwiebel game). Consider the SZ game between the …rm and n workers. Assume that the total surplus is positive, i.e. y n n 1 nb > 0. In the limit for p ! 0, the unique SPE of the game is such that the payo¤ n to the …rm is given by the di¤erence equation
jb] , for j = 1; 2; :::n,
with initial condition 0 = y 0 . The payo¤ w n;i to the i-th of n workers is given by
Proof : It is straightforward to show that if y n n 1 nb > 0 then y j j 1 jb > 0 for j = 1; 2; :::n 1. From this observation and Proposition 1, it follows that j is given by (16) for j = 1; 2; :::n and w n;i is given by (17) for i = 1; 2; :::n. Taking the limit of (16) and (17) for p ! 0, we obtain (26) and (27).
Theorem 1 shows that the properties of the solution to the SZ game with 2 workers generalize nicely to the game with n workers. First, the worker's payo¤s are decreasing with respect to the order in which they bargain with the …rm. In general, the i-th worker to bargain with the …rm captures a share of the total surplus that is twice as large as the one captured by the (i + 1)-th worker. This is intuitive. If the …rm pays the i-th worker an extra dollar, the gains from trade between the …rm and the remaining n i workers decline and the wage of all of these workers falls by a total of 1 1=2 n i dollars. Hence, the …rm's cost from paying the i-th worker an extra dollar is 1=2 n i . If the …rm pays the (i + 1)-th worker an extra dollar, the gains from trade between the …rm and the remaining n i 1 workers decline and the wage of all of these workers falls by a total of 1 1=2 n i 1 dollars. Hence, the …rm's cost from paying the (i + 1)-th worker an extra dollar is 1=2 n i 1 . Since the cost to the …rm from paying the i-th worker an extra dollar is half of the cost from paying the (i + 1)-th worker an extra dollar, the i-th worker captures twice as much of the total surplus as the (i + 1)-th worker.
Second, the payo¤s in (26)-(27) are di¤erent from the Shapley values. In fact, the Shapley value n of the …rm is given by the di¤erence equation
jb , for j = 1; 2; :::n,
with initial condition 0 = y 0 . The Shapley value w n of each worker is given by and Zwiebel is incorrect for every number of workers strictly greater than one. 5 Even though the SZ game does not deliver the Shapley values as equilibrium payo¤s, the solution of the game is of some interest as the protocol is quite natural. Hence, it is useful to discuss some of its features. It is easy to verify by induction that, for any number of workers n, the payo¤ to the …rm in the SZ game is strictly smaller than the Shapley value. This is intuitive because, in the SZ game, the …rst worker can hold up the …rm and capture some of its gains from trade with the other workers and, hence, obtain a wage that is higher than his expected marginal contribution (i.e., his Shapley value). Next, notice that, if the …rm chooses how many workers to hire and wages are set according to the SZ game, it will choose N such that 6 N N 1 : = 0 or, equivalently, such that y N N N b : = 0. In 5 More precisely, we proved that there is a unique SPE in which, when indi¤erent, the …rm rejects any o¤er from the …rst worker (and does not make any countero¤er to the …rst worker) that induces to a breakdown in negotiations with the second worker. It is easy to show that the payo¤s in Stole and Zwiebel (1996a) do not constitute an SPE. 6 Following Stole and Zwiebel (1996a), we use the notation x N x N 1 : = 0 as shorthand for x N x N 1 0 and x N +1 x N 0.
contrast, if wages are given by the worker's Shapley values, the …rm will choose N such that N N 1 : = 0 or, equivalently, such that y N N N b : = 0. Since n < n , it follows immediately that the …rm will hire more workers if the wages are set according to the SZ game. In turn, we know from Stole and Zwiebel (1996a) , that if the wages are given by the Shapley values, the …rm will hire more workers than it is e¢ cient as hiring an extra worker not only increases output, but it also lowers the wage of the inframarginal workers.
Thus, there will be even more overhiring when wages are set according to the SZ game than when they are set given by the workers'Shapley values.
3 The Rolodex Game
Environment and Preliminaries
In this section, we propose a novel bargaining game between a …rm and multiple workers, which we refer to as the Rolodex game. The players in the game are a …rm and n identical workers. If the …rm employs k workers and pays them wages w 1 , w 2 , ....w k , its payo¤ is y k w 1 w 2 :::w k , where y k denotes the value of the output produced by the …rm with k employees. We assume that y k is strictly increasing and concave in k, i.e. y k < y k+1 and y k+1 y k > y k+2 y k+1 for k = 0; 1; 2; :::. If a worker is hired by the …rm at the wage w, his payo¤ is w. If the worker is not hired by the …rm, his payo¤ is b 0, where b might represent the value of employment at some other …rm or the value of unemployment.
The workers are initially placed in some arbitrary order from 1 to n. The game consists of a …nite sequence of bargaining sessions between the …rm and one of the workers. The game starts with a bargaining session between the …rm and the …rst worker in the order.
The game ends when the …rm has reached an agreement with all the workers left in the game. When this happens, the …rm pays the agreed-upon wage to each of the workers and production takes place.
Each bargaining session involves one round of o¤er and countero¤er. The session starts with the worker making a wage o¤er. If the …rm accepts the o¤er, the …rm enters a bargaining session with the worker who, among those that have yet to reach an agreement, is next in the order. If the …rm rejects the o¤er, negotiations break down with probability p and continue with probability 1 p. If negotiations break down, the worker exits the game, all past agreements are erased and the whole bargaining process starts over with the workers who are still in the game being placed in some random order. 7 If negotiations continue, the …rm 7 We assume that the remaining workers are placed in some random order only for the sake of concreteness. 20 makes a countero¤er. If the worker accepts the countero¤er, the …rm enters a bargaining session with the worker who, among those that have yet to reach an agreement, is next in the order. If the worker rejects the o¤er, negotiations break down with probability p and continue with probability 1 p. If the negotiations continue, the worker takes the last place in the order of workers who have yet to reach an agreement, and the …rm enters a bargaining session with the worker who is now …rst in the order among those who are still without agreement.
It is useful to compare the Rolodex game with the SZ game. In the SZ game, a bargaining session between a …rm and a worker continues until the …rm and the worker reach an agreement or until the worker exits the game. Under this bargaining protocol, the worker can reject the …rm's countero¤ers without consequence on his position in the line of workers.
For this reason, the worker can take advantage of the fact that his wage lowers the wage paid by the …rm to the workers who follow him and, in equilibrium, workers at the front of the line earn higher wages than workers at the end of the line. In the Rolodex game, a worker moves to the end of the line if he rejects the …rm's countero¤er. Under this bargaining protocol, any worker is in the same strategic position as the last worker in the line. As we shall see in the next pages, this implies that every worker ends up earning the same wage and this common wage is the Shapley value.
It is also useful to compare the Rolodex game with the bargaining games in Gul (1986),
Hart and Mas-Colell (1996) and De Fontenay and Gans (2014). The games in Gul and
Hart and Mas-Colell have equilibrium payo¤s equal to the Shapley values. However, in the protocol of both of these games, the …rm and each of the workers have a symmetric role. In the Gul game, each bargaining session involves two randomly selected players, which may be a worker and the …rm-in which case the …rm buys the labor of the worker-but also may be two workers-in which case one worker buys the labor of the other worker. In the Hart and
Mas-Colell game, each player has an equal probability of proposing an entire allocation. This player may be the …rm-in which case, the …rm o¤ers a wage to each of the workers-but it also may be a worker-in which case, the worker demands a wage for himself and for his coworkers. In contrast, in the protocol of the Rolodex game, the …rm and the worker have di¤erent roles. In particular, every bilateral bargaining session involves the …rm and one of the workers, and the object of the bargain is the wage of the worker at hand. We believe that the Rolodex game conforms better to a real-world labor negotiation. The game in De
All the results in this Section continue to hold if the remaining workers are placed in their original order, in the order at the time of breakdown, or in any other order. Indeed, we do not make use of the assumption about the workers'ordering in any of the proofs.
Fontenay and Gans assumes that the …rm bargains with each worker through a di¤erent delegate, and that the outcome of each bargain is observed only by the delegate and the worker directly involved unless it is a breakdown. 8 In contrast, in the Rolodex game, the …rm bargains directly with every worker and all the outcomes are publicly observed.
Rolodex Game with Two Workers
Let us begin the analysis of the Rolodex game by introducing some notation. We shall refer to n n (0) as the subgame in which the …rm is left with n workers, it has yet to reach an agreement with any of the workers, and it is about to enter a bargaining session with the …rst one in line. We denote with n the payo¤ to the …rm in this game, and with w n;i the payo¤ to the i-th of n workers. Clearly, the Rolodex game between the …rm and n workers is the subgame n n (0). We shall refer to n k (s) as the subgame in which there are n workers left in the game, n k of them have reached an agreement with the …rm for wages summing up to s, k workers have yet to reach an agreement with the …rm, and the …rm is about to start a bargaining session with the …rst of those k workers. We denote with w n k;i (s) the equilibrium wage of the i-th of the k workers without agreement, and with t n k (s) the sum of wages of the k workers without agreement.
As we did for the SZ game, we shall focus on Subgame Perfect Equilibria. Here, however, we restrict attention to SPE with two additional properties. First, we restrict attention to Markov SPE, i.e. SPE such that the players follow the same strategies whenever they are in subgames with the same payo¤ relevant states (n; k; s). Second, we restrict attention to SPE without delay, i.e. SPE such that, in any subgame where the gains from trade are positive, the …rm reaches an immediate agreement with all the remaining workers. For the sake of brevity, we shall refer to the SPE with these two properties as Markov SPE. 9 In order to build some intuition, it is useful to consider the Rolodex game with 2 workers.
We solve the game backwards. First, we characterize the outcome of the subgame 1 1 (0) in which, after a breakdown in negotiations with one worker, the …rm starts bargaining with the other one. The subgame begins with the worker making an o¤er. If the o¤er is rejected the …rm makes a countero¤er. If the countero¤er is rejected, the worker moves to the end of 8 Notice also that the …rm would have an incentive to hide the fact that the bargain between a delegate and a worker ended with a breakdown. 9 The restriction to Markov SPE is common in the literature (see, e.g., Gul 1989 and Hart and Mas-Colell 1996) . The restriction to SPE without delay is also common (see, e.g., Muthoo 1999 ). The second restriction greatly simpli…es the expositions. However, we suspect that there are no Markov SPE with delay when the gains from trade are strictly positive. the line of workers without agreement. However, since there are no other workers left, the worker gets to make another o¤er right away. If the worker and the …rm eventually reach an agreement at the wage w, the …rm's payo¤ is y 1 w and the worker's payo¤ is w. If the …rm and the worker do not reach an agreement, the …rm's payo¤ is y 0 and the worker's payo¤ is b. The protocol described above boils down to the protocol of the BRW game. Hence, assuming that the gains from trade y 1 y 0 b are positive, the unique (Markov) SPE of the subgame is such that the …rm and the worker immediately reach an agreement over the wage
In turn, this implies that the …rm's equilibrium payo¤ in the subgame is
Second, we characterize the outcome of the subgame 2 1 (w 1 ) in which, after the …rm and the …rst worker have reached an agreement at some arbitrary wage w 1 , the …rm starts bargaining with the second worker. The subgame begins with the second worker making an o¤er. If the o¤er is rejected, the …rm makes a countero¤er. If the countero¤er is rejected, the worker moves to the end of the line of workers who have yet to reach an agreement with the …rm. Since there are no other workers with whom the …rm has yet to agree, the worker gets to make another o¤er right away. If the …rm and the second worker eventually agree on a wage w 2 , the …rm's payo¤ is y 2 w 1 w 2 and the worker's payo¤ is w 2 . If the …rm and the second worker do not reach an agreement, the worker exits the game and the …rm enters a bargaining session with the …rst worker. In this case, the …rm's payo¤ is 1 and the worker's payo¤ is b. Overall, the protocol and the payo¤ structure of the bargaining session between the …rm and the second worker are the same as in the BRW game. Hence, if the gains from trade y 2 1 w 1 b are negative, any (Markov) SPE is such that the …rm and the second worker do not reach an agreement. If the gains from trade are positive, the unique (Markov) SPE is such that the …rm and the second worker immediately agree to the wage
Since the second worker is the only worker without an agreement in the 2 1 (w 1 ) subgame, t 2 1 (w 1 ) is equal to w 2 1;1 (w 1 ).
Third, we characterize the outcome of the subgame 2 2 (0) in which the …rm has yet to reach an agreement with both workers. To this aim, consider the bargaining session between the …rm and the …rst worker. We analyze this bargaining session backwards. That is, we …rst characterize the optimal response of the worker to an arbitrary countero¤er of the …rm.
Then, we solve for the optimal countero¤er of the …rm. Next, we characterize the optimal response of the …rm to an arbitrary o¤er of the worker. Finally, we solve for the optimal o¤er of the worker. We carry out the analysis for the case in which there are strictly positive gains from trade, i.e. y 2
As a preliminary step, we establish some properties of the wage w 2;1 that the …rm and the …rst worker agree upon. First, notice that w 2;1 must be greater than b, as the worker never …nds it optimal to accept or o¤er a wage that is lower than his outside option. Second, notice that w 2;1 must be smaller than y 2 1 b. In fact, if w 2;1 > y 2 1 b, the …rm would not reach an agreement with the second worker and w 2;1 could not be part of an SPE in which the …rm trades without delay with both employees. Third, notice that w 2;1 must be greater than pb + (1 p)w 2 1;1 (w 2;1 ). To see why this is the case, note that when the …rm makes a countero¤er, the worker can always attains a payo¤ of u w = pb+(1 p)w 2 1;1 (w 2;1 ) by rejecting the countero¤er, moving to the end of the line of workers who have yet to reach an agreement, and then agree to the wage w 2 1;1 (w 2;1 ). This implies that, in an SPE without delay, the …rm's payo¤ when making a countero¤er cannot be greater than u f = y 2 u w t 2 1 (u w ) and that the …rm will always be willing to accept any o¤er w such that y 2 w t 2 1 (w) u f . Since y 2 w t 2 1 (w) is decreasing in w and the …rm accepts any o¤er w such that y 2 w t 2 1 (w) u f , the worker can always attain a payo¤ of u w . In a Markov SPE without delay, this implies that w 2;1 pb + (1 p)w 2 1;1 (w 2;1 ).
Given the preliminary results above, we can solve for the optimal response of the worker to some arbitrary countero¤er by the …rm. Suppose that the …rm makes a countero¤er 
The condition above is easy to understand. The left-hand side of (33) is the worker's payo¤ if he accepts the countero¤er of the …rm. The right-hand side of (33) is the worker's expected payo¤ is he rejects the countero¤er of the …rm. With probability p, there is a breakdown and the worker exits the game. In this case, the worker's payo¤ is b. With probability 1 p, the worker remains in the game but moves to the end of the line of workers without agreement.
In this case, the worker's payo¤ is w 2 1;1 (w 2;1 ). In fact, the …rm will reach an agreement with the next worker for a wage of w 2;1 and, when the …rm returns to bargaining with the …rst worker, there will be an immediate agreement over the wage w 2 1;1 (w 2;1 ). As we shall see below, the …rm never …nds it optimal to make a countero¤er w > y 2 1 b, whether the worker accepts it or not.
The …rm chooses its countero¤er taking as given the worker's acceptance strategy. If the …rm makes a countero¤er w y 2 1 b that satis…es (33), it attains a payo¤ of y 2 w t 2 1 (w). In fact, the worker accepts the countero¤er w and the …rm immediately reaches an agreement with the next worker for the wage t 2 1 (w). If the …rm makes a countero¤er w y 2 1 b that violates (33), it attains a payo¤ of p 1 + (1 p) [y 2 w 2;1 t 2 1 (w 2;1 )]. In fact, the worker rejects the countero¤er w. Then, with probability p, the worker exits the game and the …rm is left with only one worker. In this case, the …rm's payo¤ is 1 . With probability 1 p, the worker remains in the game, but moves to the end of the line of workers without agreement.
In this case, the …rm's payo¤ is y 2 w 2;1 t 2 1 (w 2;1 ). Finally, if the …rm makes a countero¤er w > y 2 1 b, it attains a payo¤ of 1 if the worker accepts the countero¤er, and a payo¤ of p 1 + (1 p) [y 2 w 2;1 t 2 1 (w 2;1 )] if the worker rejects the countero¤er.
The countero¤er that maximizes the payo¤ of the …rm is
It is easy to show why this is the case. Recall that w c w 2;1 and w 2;1 y 2 1 b, and notice that at least one inequality is strict as w c = w 2;1 = y 2 
If the …rm makes a countero¤er w 0 < w c , condition (33) is violated and the …rm attains a payo¤ of
where at least one of the two inequalities in (37) is strict. The …rst inequality follows from the fact that y 2 w t 2 1 (w) 1 for all w y 2 1 b and w 2;1 y 2 1 b. The second inequality follows from the fact that y 2 w t 2 1 (w) is strictly decreasing in w and w c w 2;1 . At least one of the two inequalities is strict, as they both hold as equalities only when w c = w 2;1 = y 2 1 b, which is a possibility we have already ruled out. Now, consider the …rm's payo¤ from making some alternative countero¤er w 0 , with w 0 > y 2 1 b. If the …rm makes a countero¤er w 0 > y 2 1 b which is accepted, it attains a payo¤ of
where the …rst inequality follows from the fact that y 2 w 2;1 t 2 1 (w 2;1 ) is greater than 1 , and the second inequality follows from (37). If the …rm makes a countero¤er w 0 > y 2 1 b which is rejected, it attains a payo¤ of p 1 + (1 p) [y 2 w 2;1 t 2 1 (w 2;1 )], which is strictly smaller than y 2 w c t 2 1 (w c ). We have thus established that w c is the countero¤er that maximizes the payo¤ to the …rm.
Given the characterization of the optimal countero¤er w c , we can …nd the optimal acceptance strategy of the …rm to an arbitrary wage o¤er by the worker. Suppose that the worker makes an o¤er w y 2 1 b. The …rm …nds it optimal to accept w if and only if
The condition above is easy to understand. The left-hand side of (39) is the payo¤ to the …rm from accepting the o¤er w. If the …rm accepts the o¤er of the …rst worker, it starts bargaining with the second worker and immediately reaches an agreement at the wage w 2 1;1 (w). Hence, the …rm's payo¤ from accepting the o¤er w is y 2 w t 2 1 (w). The right-hand side of (39) is the payo¤ to the …rm from rejecting the o¤er w. If the …rm rejects the o¤er, the worker exits with probability p. In this case, the …rm is left with one worker and its payo¤ is 1 . With probability 1 p, the worker remains in the game and the …rm makes him a countero¤er w c . The worker accepts it and the …rm and the second worker reach an immediate agreement at the wage w 2 1;1 (w c ). Hence, the …rm's payo¤ from rejecting the o¤er w is
. Now, suppose that the worker makes an o¤er w > y 2 1 b. In this case the …rm rejects the o¤er w, as (38) guarantees that the …rm's payo¤ from rejecting,
, is strictly greater than the …rm's payo¤ from accepting, 1 .
The worker chooses the o¤er w taking as given the …rm's acceptance strategy. If the worker makes an o¤er w y 2 1 b that satis…es (39), the …rm accepts the o¤er and reaches an immediate agreement with the other worker. In this case, the worker's payo¤ is w. If the worker makes an o¤er w y 2 1 b that violates (39), the …rm rejects the o¤er w. Then, with probability p, the worker exits the game. With probability 1 p, the …rm makes the countero¤er w c , which the worker accepts, and then it reaches an immediate agreement with the other worker. In this case, the worker's payo¤ is pb + (1 p)w c . Finally, if the worker makes an o¤er w > y 2 1 b, the …rm rejects the o¤er and the worker's payo¤
The o¤er that maximizes the worker's payo¤ is w o such that
It is easy to verify that this is the case. Notice that w o is strictly greater than w c and strictly smaller than y 2 1 b. In fact, since y 2 w c t 2 1 (w c ) > 1 , the right-hand side of (40) is strictly greater than 1 and strictly smaller than y 2 w c t 2 1 (w c ). The left-hand side of (40) is strictly decreasing in w o and takes the value y 2 w c t 2 1 (w c ) for w o = w c , and the value 1 for w o = y 2 1 b. Hence, the o¤er w o that equates the left and the right-hand sides of (40) is strictly greater than w c and strictly smaller than We are now in the position to explicitly solve for the optimal countero¤er of the …rm, w c , and the optimal o¤er of the worker, w o . Using (32) to substitute out w 2 1;1 (w 2;1 ) in (34), we …nd that w c is given by
Using (32) to substitute out w 2 1;1 (w o ) in (40), we …nd that w o is given by
Using the fact that in a Markov SPE w o = w 2;1 , we can use the above equations to …nd that w 2;1 is given by
This completes the characterization of the Rolodex game 2 2 (0) between the …rm and 2 workers. To summarize, if the gains from trade are strictly positive, i.e. y 2 the unique Markov SPE has the following features. The …rm and the …rst worker reach an immediate agreement at the wage w 2;1 in (43). The …rm and the second worker reach an immediate agreement at the wage w 2;2 = t 2 1 (w 2;1 ) given by
The pro…t of the …rm 2 = y 2 w 2;1 w 2;2 is given by
In the limit for p going to zero, the equilibrium payo¤ to the …rst worker is
The equilibrium payo¤ to the second worker is
The equilibrium payo¤ to the …rm is
The payo¤s in (46)-(48) are equal to the Shapley values to the workers and the …rm. Hence, the Rolodex game o¤ers a game-theoretic foundation to the standard cooperative solution to the bargaining problem between a …rm and two workers. The Rolodex game follows a natural protocol, in which the …rm participates in every bilateral negotiation and, in any bilateral negotiation, only the wage of the participating worker is discussed. Moreover, the Rolodex game is one of perfect information, where there is no need to make assumptions about o¤-equilibium beliefs.
There is a simple intuition behind the equivalence of the equilibrium payo¤s of the Rolodex game and the Shapley values. First, notice that every worker earns the same wage as the last worker in line. Indeed, a worker at any position in the line knows that if he rejects the …rm's countero¤er he will become the last worker in line and, for this reason, he has the same outside option and earns the same wage as the last worker in line. That is, w 2;1 = w 2;2 = w 2 . Second, notice that the wage of the last worker is such that the gains from trade accruing to the worker are equal to the gains from trade accruing to the …rm, as the last worker's wage does not a¤ect the wage agreement with any other worker. Under the assumption that a disagreement causes the bargaining game to start over, the wage of the last worker is such that w 2;2 b = y 2 w 2;1 w 2;2 1 . Combining the two observations above, we …nd that w 2 b = y 2 1 2w 2 . As explained in Stole and Zwiebel (1996a) , the solution to this equation is equal to the worker's Shapley value.
Rolodex Game with n Workers
The properties of the solution of the Rolodex game with 2 workers generalize to the case of an arbitrary number of workers. The following proposition contains the characterization of the unique Markov SPE of the subgame n n (0) in which the …rm has yet to reach an agreement with all of the n workers remaining in the game. nb 0, the unique Markov SPE is such that the …rm immediately reaches an agreement with all of the n workers. The payo¤ to the …rm is given by
For n = 1, Proposition 2 holds as the payo¤s in (49) and (50) boil down to the equilibrium payo¤s of the BRW game. For n = 2, Proposition 2 holds as the payo¤s in (49) and (50) coincide with those derived in the previous subsection. In the next pages, we are going to prove that Proposition 2 holds for a generic n by induction. That is, we are going to prove that if the proposition holds for the subgame n n (0), it also holds for the subgame n+1 n+1 (0) in which the …rm has yet to reach an agreement with all of the n + 1 workers left in the game.
Central to the characterization of the subgame n+1 n+1 (0) is the following lemma. 
The wage paid to the …rst of the k remaining workers is
The wage paid to the last of the k remaining workers is
For k = 1, Lemma 3 holds as the payo¤s in (51)-(53) are the same as in the BRW game.
We prove that Lemma 3 holds for any k n + 1 by induction. That is, we prove that, if Lemma 3 holds for some arbitrary k n, then it also holds for k + 1. To this aim, we consider the subgame n+1 k+1 (s), in which the …rm has n + 1 employees, it has yet to reach an agreement with k + 1 of them and it has agreed to wages summing up to s with the other n k. As usual, we characterize the solution to this subgame by backward induction.
First, consider the subgame n n (0) in which, after a breakdown in negotiations between the …rm and the …rst of the k + 1 workers without agreement, bargaining starts over between the …rm and the n workers left in the game. Since we have conjectured that Proposition 2 holds when the …rm has n workers, the SPE payo¤ of the …rm in this subgame is uniquely determined and given by n .
Second, consider the subgame n+1 k (s + w 1 ) in which, after the …rm has reached an agreement at some wage w 1 with the …rst worker without an agreement, the …rm starts bargaining with the other k workers without an agreement. Since we conjectured that Lemma 3 holds when the …rm has n + 1 workers and has yet to reach an agreement with k of them, there is a unique Markov SPE to this subgame. In particular, if w 1 > w n+1 k+1 (s) y n+1 s n kb, any SPE is such that the …rm does not reach an agreement with all of the k remaining workers. In this case, the …rm's payo¤ is n . If w 1 w n+1 k+1 (s), the unique SPE is such that the …rm immediately reaches an agreement with all of the k remaining workers.
In this case, the …rm's payo¤ is y n+1 s w 1 t n+1 k (s + w 1 ).
Third, we characterize the outcome of the subgame n+1 k+1 (s). To this aim, consider the bargaining session between the …rm and the …rst of the k + 1 workers without an agreement.
We analyze this bargaining session backwards. We …rst characterize the optimal response of the worker to an arbitrary countero¤er of the …rm. We then solve for the optimal countero¤er of the …rm. Next, we characterize the optimal response of the …rm to an arbitrary o¤er of the worker. And, …nally, we solve for the optimal o¤er of the worker. We carry out the analysis for the case in which there are strictly positive gains from trade, i.e. y n+1 s n b t n+1 k (s+b) > 0 or equivalently y n+1 s n (k + 1)b > 0.
As in the case of two workers, let us establish some basic properties of the wage w n+1 k+1;1 (s) that the …rm negotiates with the …rst of the k+1 workers without agreement. First, w n+1 k+1;1 (s) is greater than b, as the worker never …nds it optimal to accept or o¤er a wage lower than his outside option. Second, w n+1 k+1;1 (s) is smaller than w n+1 k+1 (s). In fact, if w n+1 k+1;1 (s) > w n+1 k+1 (s), the …rm would not reach an agreement with all of the remaining workers and, hence, w n+1 k+1;1 (s) could not be part of an SPE in which the …rm trades without delay with all of its k + 1 employees. Third, w n+1 k+1;1 (s) is greater than pb + (1 p)w n+1 k;k (s + w n+1 k+1;1 (s)). To see why, notice that when the …rm makes a countero¤er, the worker can attains a payo¤ of u w = pb + (1 p)w n+1 k;k (s + w n+1 k+1;1 (s)) by rejecting such o¤er, moving to the end of the line, and agreeing to the wage w n+1 k;k (s + w n+1 k+1;1 (s)) after the …rm reaches an agreement with the other workers. This implies that, in an SPE without delay, the …rm's payo¤ when making a countero¤er cannot be greater than u f = y n+1 u w t n+1 k (s + u w ) and that the …rm will always be willing to accept any o¤er w such that y n+1 s w t n+1 k (s + w) u f . Since y n+1 s w t n+1 k (s + w) is decreasing in w and the …rm accepts any o¤er w such that y n+1 s w t n+1 k (s+w) u f , the worker can always attain a payo¤ of u w . In a Markov SPE without delay, this implies that w n+1 k+1;1 (s) is greater than u w = pb+(1 p)w n+1 k;k (s+w n+1 k+1;1 (s)).
Given the preliminary results above, we can solve for the optimal response of the worker to an arbitrary countero¤er by the …rm. Suppose that the …rm makes a countero¤er w w n+1 k+1 (s) to the worker. The worker …nds it optimal to accept w if and only if w pb + (1 p)w n+1 k;k (s + w n+1 k+1;1 (s)).
The above condition is easy to understand. The left-hand side of (54) is the worker's payo¤ if he accepts the countero¤er of the …rm. In fact, if the worker accepts w w n+1 k+1 (s), the …rm immediately reaches an agreement with all the other k workers and the worker is paid the agreed upon wage w. The right-hand side of (54) is the worker's payo¤ if he rejects the countero¤er of the …rm. In fact, if the worker rejects w, he exits the game and attains the payo¤ b with probability p. With probability 1 p, the worker moves to the end of the line of workers without an agreement. The …rm immediately agrees with the next worker to a wage w n+1 k+1;1 (s) and, then, it starts bargaining with the k remaining workers. From Lemma 3, it follows that the last of these k workers (who is the worker who rejected w) agrees to a wage w n+1 k;k (s + w n+1 k+1;1 (s)). Hence, the right-hand side of (54) is the worker's payo¤ if he rejects the countero¤er of the …rm. As we shall see below, the …rm never …nds it optimal to make a countero¤er w > w n+1 k+1 (s), whether the worker accepts it or not.
The …rm chooses its countero¤er taking as given the acceptance strategy of the worker.
If the …rm makes a countero¤er w w n+1 k+1 (s) such that condition (54) is satis…ed, its payo¤ is y n+1 s w t n+1 k (s + w). In fact, the worker accepts w and the …rm immediately reaches an agreement with the k remaining workers for a total wage bill of t n+1 k (s + w). If the …rm makes a countero¤er w w n+1 k+1 (s) such that condition (54) is violated, its expected payo¤ is p n + (1 p) y n+1 s w n+1 k+1;1 (s) t n+1 k (s + w n+1 k+1;1 (s)) . In fact, the worker rejects w. With probability p, the worker exits the game and the bargaining game starts over between the …rm and the surviving n workers. In this case, the …rm's payo¤ is n . With probability 1 p, the worker moves to the end of the line of workers without agreement. Then, the …rm reaches an agreement with the next worker for a wage of w n+1 k+1;1 (s) and with the remaining k workers for wages summing up to t n+1 k (s + w n+1 k+1;1 (s)). In this case, the …rm's payo¤ is y n+1 s w n+1 k+1;1 (s) t n+1 k (s + w n+1 k+1;1 (s)).
The countero¤er that maximizes the payo¤ of the …rm is w c = pb + (1 p)w n+1 k;k (s + w n+1 k+1;1 (s)).
It is easy to show why this is the case. Recall that w c w n+1 k+1;1 (s) and w n+1 k+1;1 (s) w n+1 k+1 (s), and notice that at least one inequality is strict as w c = w n+1 k+1;1 (s) = w n+1 k+1 (s) contradicts the assumption of strictly positive gains from trade. Since w c < w n+1 k+1 (s) and satis…es condition (54), the …rm's payo¤ from making the countero¤er w c is 
where at least one of the two inequalities in (58) is strict. The …rst inequality follows from the fact that y n+1 s w t n+1 k (s + w) n for all w w n+1 k+1 (s) and w n+1 k+1;1 (s) w n+1 k+1 (s). The second inequality follows from the fact that y n+1 s w t n+1 k (s + w) is strictly decreasing in w and w c w n+1 k+1;1 (s). At least one of the two inequalities is strict, as they are both equalities only when w c = w n+1 k+1;1 (s) = w n+1 k+1 (s), a possibility we have already ruled out. Now, consider the …rm's payo¤ from making some alternative countero¤er w 0 > w n+1 k+1 (s). If the …rm makes a countero¤er w 0 > w n+1 k+1 (s) which is accepted, it attains a payo¤ of
where the …rst inequality follows from the fact that y n+1 s w t n+1 k (s + w) is greater than n for w = w n+1 k+1;1 (s), and the second inequality follows from (58). If the …rm makes a countero¤er w 0 > w n+1 k+1 (s) which is rejected, it attains the same payo¤ as in the …rst line of (58), which is strictly smaller than y n+1 s w c t n+1 k (s + w c ). Thus, we have established that w c is the countero¤er that maximizes the payo¤ to the …rm.
Given the characterization of w c , we can …nd the optimal acceptance strategy of the …rm to an arbitrary wage o¤er by the worker. Suppose that the worker makes an o¤er 
The above condition is easy to understand. The left-hand side of (60) is the …rm's payo¤ from accepting the o¤er. If fact, if the …rm accepts an o¤er w w n+1 k+1 (s), it immediately reaches an agreement with the k remaining workers for wages summing up to t n+1 k (s + w).
Hence, if the …rm accepts the o¤er w w n+1 k+1 (s), its payo¤ is given by the left-hand side of (60). The right-hand side of (60) is the …rm's expected payo¤ from rejecting the o¤er. In fact, if the …rm rejects w, with probability p, the worker exits and the bargaining game starts over with the n surviving workers. In this case, the …rm's payo¤ is n . With probability 1 p, the worker remains in the game and the …rm makes him the countero¤er w c . In this case, the …rm's payo¤ is y n+1 s w c t n+1 k (s + w c ). Hence, if the …rm rejects the o¤er w w n+1 k+1 (s), its expected payo¤ is given by the right-hand side of (60). Now, suppose that the worker makes an o¤er w > w n+1 k+1 (s). In this case the …rm rejects the o¤er, as (59) guarantees that the …rm's payo¤ from rejecting, p n +(1 p) y n+1 s w c t n+1 k (s + w c ) , is strictly greater than the …rm's payo¤ from accepting, n .
The worker chooses the o¤er w taking as given the …rm's acceptance strategy. If the worker makes an o¤er w w n+1 k+1 (s) that satis…es (60), the worker's payo¤ is w as the …rm accepts the o¤er and reaches an immediate agreement with all the k remaining workers. If the worker makes an o¤er w w n+1 k+1 (s) that violates (60), the worker's expected payo¤ is pb + (1 p)w c . In fact, the …rm rejects the o¤er w. Then, with probability p, the worker exits the game and achieves the payo¤ b. With probability 1 p, the worker remains in the game and the …rm makes him the acceptable countero¤er w c . Similarly, if the worker makes an o¤er w > w n+1 k+1 (s), the …rm rejects the o¤er and the worker's expected payo¤ is pb + (1 p)w c .
The worker …nds it optimal to make to the …rm the o¤er w o such that
It is easy to verify that this is the case. To this aim, notice that w o is greater than w c and smaller than w n+1 k+1 (s). In fact, since y n+1 s w c t n+1 k (s + w c ) > n , the right-hand side of (61) is strictly greater than n and strictly smaller than y n+1 s w c t n+1 k (s + w c ). The left-hand side of (61) is strictly decreasing in w o , it takes the value y n+1 s w c t n+1 k (s+w c )
for w o = w c , and it takes the value n for w o = w n+1 k+1 (s). Hence, the w o that equates the left and the right-hand side of (61) is strictly greater than w c and strictly smaller than w n+1 k+1 (s). Now, notice that, since the o¤er w o satis…es (60) and it is smaller than w n+1 k+1 (s), the …rm accepts it and the worker's payo¤ is w o . In contrast, if the worker makes an o¤er w 0 < w o , the …rm accepts it and the worker's payo¤ is w 0 < w o . Similarly, if the worker makes an o¤er w 0 > w o , the …rm rejects it, as either w 0 violates (60) or w 0 > w n+1 k+1 (s). In this case, the worker's payo¤ is pb + (1 p)w c , which we argued is smaller than w o . Thus, we have established that w o is the o¤er that maximizes the payo¤ to the worker. Now, we are in the position to explicitly solve for the optimal countero¤er of the …rm, w c , and the optimal o¤er of the worker, w o . Using (53) to substitute out w n+1 k;k (s + w) in (55), we …nd that w c is given by
Using (51) to substitute out t n+1 k (s + w) in (61), we …nd that w o is given by
Using the fact that in a Markov SPE w o = w n+1 k+1;1 (s), we can use the above equations to …nd that w n+1 k+1;1 (s) is given by
We have completed the characterization of the subgame n+1 k+1 (s). If the gains from trade are positive, i.e. y n+1 s n (k + 1)b > 0, the unique Markov SPE is such that the …rm and the …rst of the k + 1 remaining workers reach an immediate agreement at the wage w n+1 k+1;1 (s), and the …rm and the i-th of the k + 1 remaining workers reach an immediate agreement at the wage w n+1 k+1;i (s) = w n+1 k+2 i;1 (s + P i 1 j=1 w n+1 k+1;j (s)). The wage w n+1 k+1;1 (s) paid to the …rst worker is given by (64). The wage w n+1 k+1;k+1 (s) = w n+1 k;k (s + w n+1 k+1;1 (s)) paid to the last worker is given by
The sum of wages t n+1 k+1 (s) = w n+1 k+1;1 (s) + t n+1 k (s + w n+1 k+1;1 (s)) paid to the k + 1 workers is given by
If the gains from trade between the …rm and the remaining k + 1 workers are equal to zero, it is easy to verify that the unique Markov SPE also involves immediate agreement at the wages (65) and (66). Finally, if the gains from trade between the …rm and the remaining k + 1 workers are strictly negative, it is easy to verify that any (Markov) SPE is such that the …rm does not reach an agreement with all of the k + 1 workers. These observations show that, if Lemma 3 holds for some k < n + 1, it also holds for k + 1. Since the lemma trivially holds for k = 1, this means that it holds for any generic k. We have thus concluded the proof of Lemma 3.
Letting k = n + 1 and s = 0 in Lemma 3, we can characterize the payo¤s of the subgame n+1 n+1 (0). In particular, if y n+1 n (n + 1)b > 0, the unique Markov SPE is such that the …rm immediately reaches an agreement with all of its n + 1 employees. In this case, the payo¤ to the …rm is given by
The above results show that, if Proposition 2 holds for some n, it also holds for n + 1. Since the proposition holds for n = 1, this means that it holds for any generic n = 2; 3... We have thus completed the proof of Proposition 2.
We are now in the position to characterize the solution of the Rolodex game in the limit as the probability of breakdown goes to zero.
Theorem 2: (Rolodex game). Consider the Rolodex game between the …rm and n workers.
Assume that the total surplus is positive, i.e. y n n 1 nb > 0. In the limit for p ! 0, the unique Markov SPE of the game is such that the payo¤ n to the …rm is given by the di¤erence equation
Proof : It is straightforward to show that if y n n 1 nb > 0 then y j j 1 jb > 0 for j = 1; 2; :::n 1. From this observation and Proposition 2, it follows that j is given by (49) for j = 1; 2; :::n and w n;i is given by (50) for i = 1; 2; :::n. Taking the limit of (49) and (50) for p ! 0, we obtain (69) and (70).
Theorem 2 shows that, also in the case of a generic number of workers, the equilibrium payo¤s of the Rolodex game converge to the Shapley values when the probability of a breakdown following a rejection goes to zero.
Conclusions
In this paper, we revisited the bargaining problem between a …rm and n workers. In the …rst part of the paper, we analyzed the extensive-form bargaining game proposed by Stole and Zwiebel (1996a) . We proved that the equilibrium of the SZ game is not such that all workers are paid their Shapley value, as incorrectly claimed by Stole and Zwiebel (1996a) . Indeed, we showed that the unique Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of the SZ game is such that the …rst worker to bargain with the …rm captures twice as much surplus as the second worker, who in turn captures twice as much surplus as the third worker, etc. . . The …rm captures a fraction 1=2 n of the surplus. These payo¤s are di¤erent from the Shapley values both for a particular realization of the initial ordering of workers, as well as in expectation over any distribution of orderings. In the second part of the paper, we presented an alternative extensive-form game, which we dubbed the Rolodex game. The Rolodex game follows a protocol that is sensible in the context of a wage negotiation between a …rm and its workers. Moreover, the Rolodex game admits, under some mild restrictions, a unique Subgame Perfect Equilibrium in which the pro…le of workers'wages and the pro…t of the …rm coincide with the Shapley values.
We believe that there are two important results in the paper. First, a large number of papers in the labor/search literature have adopted the Shapley values as the solution to the bargaining problem between a …rm and multiple workers and have referred to the SZ game for the game-theoretic foundation of that solution. Our paper shows that the reference to the SZ game is unwarranted and, instead, the literature should refer to the Rolodex game.
Subject to replacing the SZ game with the Rolodex game, the conclusions reached in this applied literature are still valid. Second, we believe that the correct characterization of the solution of the SZ game is of interest on its own. Indeed, one might envision situations in which a …rm needs to reach an agreement with one supplier before it can start bargaining with the next one. In these situations, we show that the upstream suppliers are in a superior bargaining position relative to the downstream suppliers and, in equilibrium, they end up extracting a larger fraction of the total surplus. This property of equilibrium suggests that it is important to investigate the actions that suppliers can take in order to bargain with a producer earlier rather than later.
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Appendix A SZ and BRW Stage Games: Equivalence
Consider the subgame n+1 k+1 (s) in which there are n + 1 workers left in the game, n k of them have reached an agreement with the …rm for wages summing up to s, k + 1 workers have yet to reach an agreement with the …rm, and the …rm is about to start a bargaining session with the …rst of those k + 1 workers.
We want to characterize the outcome of the bargaining session between the …rm and the …rst of the k + 1 workers without agreement. As discussed in the main text, if the bargaining session ends with the …rm and the worker agreeing to a wage w w n+1 k+1 (s), with w n+1 k+1 (s) y n+1 s n kb, the …rm reaches an agreement with all the k remaining workers for wages summing up to t n+1 k (s + w). Hence, in this case, the payo¤ to the …rm is y n+1 w t n+1 k (s + w) and the payo¤ to the worker is w. If the bargaining session ends with the …rm and the worker agreeing to a wage w > w n+1 k+1 (s), the …rm does not reach an agreement with the following worker. In this case, the bargaining process starts over with n workers; the payo¤ to the …rm is n and the payo¤ to the worker is w n;n+1 k . Finally, if the bargaining session ends with a breakdown, the payo¤ to the …rm is n and the payo¤ to the worker is b.
We focus on Subgame Perfect Equilibria subject to a tie-breaking rule. In particular, whenever the …rm is indi¤erent, we assume that it chooses to reject an o¤er w o > w n+1 k+1 (s) that leads to a breakdown with one of the other workers without agreement. Similarly, whenever the …rm is indi¤erent, we assume that it does not make a countero¤er w c > w n+1 k+1 (s) that leads to a breakdown with one of the other workers without agreement. In order to carry out the analysis, it is useful to introduce some additional notation. Consider the subgame that starts with the worker making an o¤er to the …rm, and denote as m W and M W the mimimum and the maximum payo¤ to the worker among all SPEs that satisfy the tie-breaking rule. Consider the subgame that starts with the …rm making a countero¤er to the worker, and denote as m F and M F the minimum and the maximum payo¤ to the …rm among all SPEs that satisfy the tie-breaking rule. Finally, it is useful to de…ne the function That is,
In what follows, we show that there is a unique SPE satisfying the tie-breaking rule and that such SPE has the same solution as the BRW game. The proof involves three intermediate claims, which closely follow the steps in Chapter 3 of Muthoo (1999) . We carry out the analysis under the assumption that there are strictly positive gains from trade, i.e. Hence, m F n . Next, suppose there is an SPE with M W > w n+1 k+1 (s). Then, at some point, the worker must either make an o¤er w o > w n+1 k+1 (s) that is accepted by the …rm, or the …rm must make a countero¤er w c > w n+1 k+1 (s) that is accepted by the worker. In the …rst case, if the …rm accepts the o¤er it attains a payo¤ of n , and if it rejects the o¤er it attains a payo¤ greater than p n + (1 p)m F n . Under the assumption that, in case of indi¤erence, the …rm rejects an o¤er that causes a breakdown with a subsequent worker, the …rm always rejects an o¤er w o > w n+1 k+1 (s). If the …rm makes a countero¤er w c > w n+1 k+1 (s) which is accepted by the worker, it attains a payo¤ n . If the …rm makes instead a countero¤er w 0 c < w n+1 k+1 (s), it attains a payo¤ non-smaller than n . Under the assumption that, in case of indi¤erence, the …rm does not make a countero¤er that causes a breakdown with a subsequent worker, the …rm never …nds it optimal to make a countero¤er w c > w n+1 k+1 (s). Hence, M W w n+1 k+1 (s). Finally, suppose there is an SPE with M F > y s b t n+1 k (s + b). Then, after some history of play, the …rm must either make a countero¤er o¤er w c < b that is accepted by the worker, or the worker must make an o¤er w o < b that is accepted by the …rm. If the …rm makes a countero¤er w c < b, the worker's payo¤ from accepting is w c and from rejecting is pb + (1 p)m W b. Hence, the worker will never accept a countero¤er w c < b. If the worker makes an o¤er w o < b that is accepted, the worker's payo¤ is w o < b m W . Hence, the worker will never make an o¤er w o < b. Hence, 
In doing so, the …rm attains a payo¤ of u F = y 2 w c t 2 1 (w c )
Now, suppose that the worker makes the …rm some arbitrary o¤er w y 2 1 b. The …rm …nds it optimal to accept the o¤er if and only if w is such that
Therefore, if it is optimal for the worker to make an o¤er w y 2 1 b, it must be the case that the worker makes the o¤er w o such that
which, after solving for w o , gives
Notice that w 2;1 < y 2 1 b, but w 2;1 is strictly smaller than w o . Therefore, the worker could attain a strictly higher payo¤ by deviating from the strategy in (B1) and by o¤ering the wage w o .
